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ABSTRACT 
The current study considers how individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) affect 
feedback effectiveness. Participants, selected to have high and low WMC, first watched a video of a 
crime. Subsequently, a post-test questionnaire was administered concerning events taken from the 
video and additional information suggested to have occurred in the video. After a 10 minute filler task, 
participants were given a two-part memory test requiring them to identify the source of the information 
presented in the test statements. During the training portion of the test, half of the participants received 
feedback as to the accuracy of their source decisions. On the second (assessment) portion of the test, 
participants did not receive any feedback. Both high and low WMC participants benefited equally from 
the presentation of feedback; both groups significantly reduced their misattributions of suggested items 
to the video. There was also a trend toward better source monitoring performance on suggested items 
in high WMC than low WMC participants, regardless of whether they received feedback. These 
findings suggest that feedback may be used to improve memory accuracy without requiring substantial 
executive resources.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you just witnessed a crime. Afterwards, police officers spend hours asking you 
questions, you end up discussing details of the crime with other witnesses and finally, just as you 
arrive home, the local news on television is describing the crime you had just witnessed. After several 
months, you are asked to give your testimony for the court. The expectation in such a situation is that 
you should be able to accurately recall the details of the crime, and only those details. Prior research 
has found that such situations involve quite a difficult memory task and that errors may often result 
(e.g., Allen & Lindsay, 1998; Lane & Zaragoza, 2007; Lane, Mather, Villa, & Morita, 2001; Lindsay, 
1993; Lindsay, Allen, Chan, & Dahl, 2003; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). In 
some circumstances, real-life witness errors may be highly consequential as evidenced by numerous 
false convictions that have been documented as a result of DNA exonerations (Scheck, Neufeld, & 
Dwyer, 2000). Because of the prevalence of these and other types of memory errors, there is great 
interest in understanding factors that affect accuracy and discovering ways that errors can be 
remediated (Benjamin & Bawa, 2004; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Starns, Lane, 
Alonzo & Roussel, 2007).   
Although there may be many ways to reduce memory errors, the current study focuses on the 
ability of people to adjust the expectations they bring to a memory task in ways that allow them to 
increase the accuracy of their judgments (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). When faced with a memory test, participants may choose their 
initial retrieval strategy or decision criteria based on  instructions given by the experimenter, memory 
for the encoding phase, or lay theories about memory (e.g., Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). To 
the extent that this metamnemonic knowledge accurately reflects task constraints, participants’ 
judgments should be accurate (Lane, Roussel et al., 2007).  
However, there is evidence to suggest that the metamnemonic knowledge of participants in false  
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memory research studies is often inaccurate or incomplete (e.g., Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; 
Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986), and thus may be one reason for the occurrence of errors in such 
studies. Interestingly, there is recent research that suggests that such knowledge can sometimes be 
updated in ways that increase memory accuracy using pre-test warnings or feedback (e.g., Lane, 
Roussel, et al., 2007; Starns et al., 2007).   
The following study is designed to follow up on recent findings that people are capable of 
improving source memory accuracy following a period of feedback training (Lane, Roussel, et al., 
2007; Lane, Groft, & Roussel, 2007). For example, Lane, Roussel, et al. (2007; Exp. 3) studied the 
effects of feedback training on source memory accuracy using the eyewitness suggestibility paradigm 
(e.g., Loftus et al., 1978; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Participants viewed a video of a mock crime and 
later answered a questionnaire about the crime. Unknown to the participants was that some questions 
included information that did not occur during the crime. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants were told about this incorrect information and given a source test containing items from 
the video, the questionnaire, both sources, and new (never presented) items. For a third of the 
participants, correct feedback was given during the first half of the source test (the training phase). 
Following each test response, participants were told the correct source (“This item was only in the 
video”). In addition, a third of the participants received incorrect feedback during training, and a third 
received no feedback (the control group). The focus was on participants’ performance on the second 
half (assessment phase) of the test. No group received feedback during this phase. Individuals who had 
received correct feedback significantly decreased their source misattribution of suggested items to the 
video, relative to the incorrect and no feedback groups.  
Lane, Roussel, et al. (2007) suggested that the feedback allowed participants to update their 
metamnemonic knowledge about the types of features that discriminate between sources, and such 
knowledge improved the accuracy of subsequent retrieval and post-retrieval processes. These  findings 
have also been replicated using picture and word stimuli developed by Henkel and Franklin (1998). In 
3 
this research (Lane, Groft, & Roussel, 2007), participants studied pictures and formed images from 
presented words. Unbeknownst to participants, the pictures and images varied in their relation (i.e., 
they formed stimulus pairs that were either from the same category, looked similar to each other, or 
were unrelated). Forty-eight hours later, participants received a two-part source memory test that 
included items that had been seen as pictures or were imagined, and new items. One-half of the 
participants received correct feedback about their judgments on the first part of the test, and the other 
half (control participants) did not. As with Lane, Roussel, et al. (2007), the focus was on the second 
half of the test in which there was no feedback administered. Results revealed that, relative to the 
control group, the feedback group reduced their misattribution of imagined items to the picture source.  
The findings of both Lane, Roussel, et al. (2007) and Lane, Groft, et al. (2007) reveal that 
providing feedback during training allows participants to significantly decrease source misattribution 
errors. Because the items on the first and second part of the test are different items, this demonstrates 
that feedback training allows participants to improve the accuracy of their retrieval or post-retrieval 
processing. Although these results are quite interesting, many issues remain to be investigated. For 
example, it is not yet clear whether there are individual differences in the ability to use feedback to 
reduce subsequent errors; or the mechanisms employed during the feedback presentation that allow 
participants to reduce their source errors. 
The following study will examine the effect individual differences in working memory have on 
the ability of participants to learn from feedback. In the next sections, I first discuss the Source  
Monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) as a theoretical explanation of source monitoring 
judgments. Next, I discuss the knowledge updating framework developed by Dunlosky and Hertzog 
(2000) and explain how such a framework can be applied to how participants learn from feedback in a 
source monitoring task. Finally, I describe the concept of working memory (Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 
2005; Engle, Tuholoski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999), the design of the current study and my 
hypotheses. 
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Source Monitoring 
According to the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), an individual’s ability to 
recognize the source of a memory does not come directly from the memory trace; rather its source is 
inferred by evaluating characteristics or mnemonic features of that memory. These judgments are 
possible because different sources have, on average, different types and amounts of mnemonic features 
such as perceptual information, contextual information, and semantic detail. For example, a memory 
that is based on perception is more likely to contain sensory (e.g., color, shape or location) or 
contextual detail than a memory that is the result of imagination, which is more likely to contain 
information about the cognitive operations involved in generating it. Johnson, et al., (1993) also argue 
that some source monitoring decisions can be made relatively automatically in the course of 
remembering them (heuristic processes). However, there is evidence to suggest that other source 
monitoring decisions are more systematic. Decisions made using these types of processes are relatively 
more time consuming and deliberate because they involve the retrieval of supporting mnemonic 
features and highlight relationships between these features and their source.  
According to the source monitoring framework, errors in source judgments primarily occur due 
to three reasons (Johnson, et al., 1993). First, because source monitoring depends on the quality of 
encoding, when situations transpire that negatively affect encoding, source judgments will suffer.  
Second, errors may occur in situations where the decision process is impaired (e.g. time constraints or 
intense stress). Third, source errors are likely to occur when the sources are difficult to discriminate, 
meaning that each source has similar qualities and mnemonic features associated with it. It has also 
been recently argued that source errors may also occur because participants’ metamnemonic 
knowledge is incomplete or incorrect (Lane, Roussel, et al. 2007; Starns et al., 2007). In such a 
situation, a participant may believe that a given feature helps discriminate between memories from 
different sources, when in fact it does not. 
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Knowledge Updating  
Dunlosky and Hertzog (2000) have recently offered the knowledge updating framework to 
explain how people learn from experience to update their metamnemonic knowledge. To date, they 
have focused mostly on how people learn to adopt new and better strategies for learning as a function 
of experience with study-test trials (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2004).This 
framework has much in common with the previously mentioned source monitoring framework 
(Johnson et. al, 1993) in that both have criteria that must be met in order to either, correctly judge a 
source (source monitoring framework) or effectively update metamnemonic knowledge (knowledge 
updating framework). The following section will compare the main assumptions of the knowledge 
updating framework to the source monitoring framework. 
 Starting with the knowledge updating framework, Dunlosky and Hertzog, 2000, maintain  that 
one must learn four major things to update their knowledge successfully (i.e., in ways that improve 
performance). First, mnemonic features must be differentially effective (effectiveness criterion). This 
is similar to the source monitoring framework’s assertion that source monitoring accuracy will increase 
as the characteristics of memories, particular to source, diverge. The second requirement in the 
knowledge updating framework is that one must monitor their memories for these features. In other 
words, participants must notice that variations in internal mnemonic cues are associated with items of 
different types (Koriat, 1997). Again, the source monitoring framework argues that judgments 
concerning source are also made on the basis of these variations in memory characteristics. Third, one 
must use this information to modify their ideas about which features are the most discriminative 
(updating metamnemonic knowledge). The fourth and final assumption is that all information provided 
from the first three assumptions must be utilized in order to modify behavior and improve 
performance. Deviating from this last assumption, the source monitoring framework specifies two 
processes by which one can determine source. The first, a systematic process, is similar to this last 
assumption of the knowledge updating framework; with this process one must have and utilize all 
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available information regarding the source decision. This process is said to be more deliberate and 
involve strategic processing. The second, a heuristically based process, is made relatively 
automatically and relies on the qualitative features of relevant memories. 
Although the knowledge updating framework was originally developed to explain how people 
learn to change their encoding strategies and the source monitoring framework developed to explain 
how one judges source, they can both be modified to explain how people might learn from feedback at 
test in ways that improve subsequent performance. As argued above, participants come to the memory 
test with a set of assumptions about the memory task that may be based on their memory of the 
encoding phase, from test instructions, or from knowledge of previous memory tasks (e.g., Lane, 
Roussel et al., 2007). After being presented with a test item, participants first retrieve mnemonic 
features associated with this item (i.e. relevant characteristics of activated memory). Subsequently, 
they have to evaluate these features and set a criterion by which they make their judgment. During the 
training phase in feedback research, participants then receive feedback about their judgment (i.e., the 
correct source). If the previous answer is incorrect, participants must first reflect on his or her previous 
answer, noting the type and amount of features present for that item. Then they would have to link this 
information to the correct item source and the existing strategies or criteria they are currently using to 
make their judgments. For example, in the case of someone deciding whether an item was previously 
presented as a picture or was imagined, they might call an item a picture if they can clearly recall  what 
the picture looked like. Participants could also react to receiving feedback by changing what they use 
to cue memory (retrieval orientation; Herron & Rugg, 2003; Rugg & Wilding, 2000) or adjusting the 
weights assigned to different features in decision criteria (Johnson, et al., 1993). Ultimately, successful 
updating involves using more discriminative features in subsequent source monitoring judgments. 
Viewed through the lens of both the source monitoring framework and the knowledge updating 
framework, learning from feedback at the time of test would appear to rely on relatively deliberate, 
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resource-consuming, systematic processes (Johnson, et al., 1993). Thus, one potential factor that might 
influence feedback use concerns individual differences in working memory. 
Working Memory 
Working memory (WM) is conceptualized as temporary storage for information that is being 
attended to or being manipulated by an executive attentional control component (Baddeley, 2007; 
Cowan, 2005; Engle et al., 1999). Working memory is critical for a number of different cognitive 
activities such as language comprehension or arithmetic (Cowan, 2005). Depending on the model, 
working memory has been conceptualized as modular, such as in Baddeley and Hitch’s 
multicomponent model (Baddeley, 2007), or as an embedded system with differing levels of activation 
(Cowan, 2005). Despite these differences in models, most researchers agree that working memory is 
limited in its capacity to store information, although the exact limit is still debated. Owing to this 
limited capacity, the executive attentional control component or focus of attention is crucial in a 
number of activities such as inhibiting distracters, maintaining task goals, and processing new 
information (Unsworth & Engle, 2005). It is the capacity of this executive attentional component that 
is purportedly measured in working memory capacity span tasks (Unsworth, et al. 2005). 
It has been argued that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) are 
associated with differences in the ability to search for and reactivate information from long-term 
memory (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Although most of the research supporting this claim has 
come from studies using multiple study-test trials and short delays (e.g., 30 seconds), there is recent 
evidence that memory accuracy for longer-term memories is affected by WMC (Lane, Elliott, Shelton, 
Roussel, Groft & Karam, 2008). Participants in that study saw pictures and formed images of objects. 
Forty-eight hours later, participants were asked to recall only the pictures they had seen and 
subsequently completed a source recognition test for all the items. Results revealed that high WMC 
participants’ source recall and source recognition was significantly more accurate than low WMC 
participants. 
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Current Study 
The goal of the following study was to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying learning from test feedback. To that end, we examined working memory 
capacity (WMC) and its effects on an individual’s ability to use feedback. Specifically, does feedback 
vary in its efficacy depending on one’s working memory capacity? High and low WMC participants 
(identified from a previous screening) were invited to participate. All participants were shown a short 
video of a burglary and chase scene (Zaragoza et. al, 1994). Following the film, participants completed 
a post-test questionnaire over material taken from the video. Unbeknownst to participants, some 
information in this questionnaire did not occur in the video; instead it was only “suggested” to have 
occurred. Participants completed a 10 minute filler task then a two-part source monitoring test. Each 
part of the test consisted of 16 statements where they were asked to indicate whether this statement 
occurred in the video, questionnaire, both the video and questionnaire, or neither. In the first section, 
the training phase, half of the participants received feedback concerning the accuracy of their source 
decision. The remaining participants received no additional information. During the second section, the 
assessment phase, no participants receive feedback concerning the accuracy of their source decisions 
for a new set of 16 statements. Thus, the assessment phase is used to evaluate whether participants 
have improved the accuracy of their source decisions as a function of receiving feedback.  
Although not the focus of this study, it is first predicted that high WMC participants will have 
better source monitoring performance than low WMC participants, based on the research discussed 
previously (Lane, et al., 2008). In the context of the current study, the specific prediction is that high 
WMC participants should be less likely to claim to have seen suggested items in the video than low 
WMC participants, regardless of whether they receive feedback. 
The question of greatest interest is the effect of WMC on the ability to utilize feedback. The 
knowledge updating framework would appear to suggest that learning from feedback at test should be 
particularly demanding of executive resources. If this is correct, this would predict that high WM 
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participants will benefit more from feedback than low WM participants. In other words, because 
learning from feedback is cognitively demanding, those with additional attentional resources should be 
better able to take advantage of it. For high WMC participants, this would be seen as a greater 
difference between the control condition and feedback condition, compared to low WMC participants.  
Although the knowledge updating framework appears to predict that learning from feedback is 
resource-demanding, there are alternative predictions that can be made. For instance, given the 
previous research described above that found that high WMC participants were more accurate at 
source monitoring than low WMC (Lane, et al., 2008), it is possible that feedback is less effective for 
high WMC participants. This is because high WMC participants may already know which features are 
most discriminative of source (i.e., they are well-calibrated), and thus may not benefit from the 
feedback as much as low WMC participants whose metamnemonic knowledge may be initially less 
accurate. Finally, there is some data in the feedback literature that suggests that people may benefit 
from feedback even without being aware of its influence on their performance. For example, Han and 
Dobbins (2008) found that feedback during a recognition test could influence participants’ criterion 
even when they were unaware that the feedback was biased (i.e., systematically incorrect). In addition, 
Lane, Roussel et al. (2007) found that many participants claimed on a post-experiment questionnaire 
that the feedback was not helpful, despite the clear effects of feedback. Both of these findings suggest 
that learning from feedback may not tax executive resources. In the context of this study, this would 
predict that high and low WMC participants would profit similarly from feedback.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
A total of 70 Louisiana State University undergraduates participated for course credit. Prior to this 
experiment, each participant completed three working memory span tasks, which included the 
operation span, the symmetry span, and the reading span (Unsworth , 2007). Scores for each span task 
were converted into z-scores, and then averaged for each participant. To take part in this study, a 
participant’s average z-score must have been either one standard deviation above or below the mean. 
Those participants who scored below one standard deviation will be referred to as participants with 
low working memory capacity (WMC). The remaining participants, those with an average z-score of 
above one standard deviation, will be referred to as participants with high working memory capacity 
(WMC). See Table 1 for descriptive statistics concerning the WMC tasks. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the control condition or the feedback condition, with the provision that there were 
equal numbers of participants with high and low WMC. There were 19 participants with low WMC in 
the control condition and 19 in the feedback condition. For participants with high WMC, 17 were in 
the control condition and 15 assigned to the feedback condition. 
Materials 
 The materials used in this study were identical to those used in Lane, Roussel, et al. (2007). These 
materials included an eyewitness event, a post-test questionnaire, and a two-part source test. The 
eyewitness event was a video depicting of a home robbery and chase scene, lasting approximately 
seven minutes (see Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996).  
The thirty-two item post-event questionnaire required participants to make a forced choice 
judgment on material from the video. Unbeknownst to the participants, information that was not in the 
video was embedded into select questionnaire items; these items will now be referred to as critical 
items.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Span Tasks. 
          Condition 
Working memory span Task    No FB Low  No FB High  FB Low FB High 
Operation Span    Mean   40.47   72.06   35.58  71.93 
     Standard Deviation 13.24   2.28   13.48  2.89 
     Minimum  18   68   52  65 
     Maximum  64   75   12  75 
    
Symmetry Span   Mean   20.74   38.82   21.00  38.33  
     Standard Deviation 6.07   2.65   7.10  2.47 
     Minimum  9   34   7  34 
     Maximum  29   42   32  42 
    
Reading Span   Mean   31.47   71.59   30.26  71.33 
     Standard Deviation 12.07   2.29   12.75  3.94 
     Minimum  7   67   11  62 
     Maximum  52   75   51  75 
Z-score Average      -1.70   1.19   -1.87  1.16 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. Data presented in this table gives the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum score for each working memory span task. 
Participants were invited to participate in the current study if their average z-score was either one standard deviation above or below the mean.  
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This “suggested” information was presupposed in the question rather than being its focus (see 
example at end of paragraph). Additionally, the suggested information was either presented once 
(suggested once) or three separate times (suggested thrice).A total of twelve critical items were used 
across the experiment. This experiment included three counterbalanced versions of the post-test 
questionnaire. In each version, four critical items were suggested once, four were suggested thrice, and 
the other four were not presented in the questionnaire (i.e., they served as control items for the source 
test). Across the experiment, all critical items were suggested once, suggested thrice, and served as 
control items equally often. The following is an example of a suggested statement (underlined 
statement) imbedded within a critical item: “Before leaving the house the thief checked the gun at his 
waist and looked both ways to see if anyone was watching. After he got out the door, did he begin to 
run?” 
The source test was comprised of thirty-two statements; sixteen presented in the first phase (i.e., 
training phase) and sixteen presented in the second phase (i.e., assessment phase). Over the course of 
the experiment, all thirty-two statements were presented to both conditions and occurred in the training 
and assessment phases equally often. Each statement originated from one of four sources including 
information found only in the video, information exclusively from the post-test questionnaire, 
information from both the video and questionnaire, and information that was never presented. In both 
phases of the source test, there were four statements belonging to each source (i.e. “video only”, 
“questions only”, “both” and “neither”). For the “questions only” source two statements were always 
suggested once, and the other two always suggested thrice. Two statements from the “neither” source 
were control items and served as suggested items in other versions of the post-test questionnaire. For 
the feedback condition, the training phase also included a display of the correct source (approximately 
two seconds) appearing after each source decision. Following the assessment phase participants 
completed a short questionnaire. The items in the questionnaire addressed issues concerning the 
amount of effort expended during the task, confidence ratings for the items and other demographic 
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questions (e.g. age, gender, etc.). For the feedback condition, several additional questions asked 
participants about their feedback usage. Specifically participants were asked whether they used the 
feedback, how much effort was put into using the feedback, and how helpful the feedback was.  
Procedure 
The experiment was administered to no more than five individuals within one session. 
Participants first watched the eyewitness event, and were then given the post-test questionnaire. They 
were told that due to the large amount of detail in the film there might be multiple questions for any 
given scene. After these instructions, participants completed the questionnaire at their own pace. Upon 
completion, a 10-minute filler task was administered asking participants to complete a number of 
puzzles.  
After the 10 minutes had elapsed, participants proceeded to the first section of the source test, 
or training phase. To increase motivation, two fifty dollar awards were offered to the two people with 
the best performance. At this point participants in both conditions were given instructions concerning 
the format of the source test. They were told that sixteen statements would appear on the screen, one at 
a time (e.g., “the thief stole a ring”). Furthermore, some of these statements had occurred only in the 
video, some only in the questionnaire, some in both and some were never presented. Their task for this 
test was to indicate the original source for each of these statements (“video only”, “questions only”, 
“both” and “neither”). They made their decision by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard 
(labeled stickers identified these designated keys). The control condition completed the first section of 
the source test with no additional instruction. In contrast, participants in the feedback condition were 
told that immediately following their judgments the correct source of the statement would be presented 
both visually and auditorally. They were instructed to use this feedback with the aim of improving 
their performance over the course of the test. After completing the training phase, participants were 
asked to complete the second section of the source test, or the assessment phase. Similar to the training 
phase, the assessment phase displayed another set of sixteen statements. For the control condition, the 
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assessment phase was identical to the training phase, in that they were again presented with statements 
and told to make their source judgment. For the feedback condition, this phase was the same as the 
previous phase with the exception that they were not given any feedback as to the accuracy of their 
source judgments. After completing the source test participants were asked a few demographic 
questions and debriefed. 
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RESULTS 
The current study addresses the question of how individual differences in working memory 
capacity (WMC) affect the efficacy of feedback use during a source monitoring task. In order to 
address this question, the primary analyses examined the between-subjects factors of feedback and 
WMC, and the within-subject factor of repetition (suggested once vs. suggested thrice) in 2X2X2 
ANOVA. The first factor, feedback, was provided during the training phase (Part 1) of the source test. 
Half of the participants received this feedback so that comparisons could be made between the 
conditions. Analyses will focus on the assessment phase in order to examine the changes in 
metamnemonic knowledge due to feedback. The second factor, individual differences in WMC, was 
collected prior to this study. These participants completed three working memory measures and were 
identified as having either low or high WMC. The third factor, repetition, concerned how many times 
participants saw a suggested item in the post-event questionnaire. This factor was not of primary 
interest in the study. In each of the analyses below, there was a significant main effect of repetition 
with participants making more errors to thrice-suggested items than once-suggested. However, the 
effect did not interact with feedback or WMC, and for that reason, the specific analyses are not 
reported below. 
The primary dependent measure, source error rates, was examined in both training and assessment 
phases. Specifically, our analyses focused on suggested information falsely attributed to the eyewitness 
event (critical items attributed to either the video or both the video and questionnaire). In previous 
work, it has been found that feedback helps to reduce these source errors. Here we examine how 
individual differences in WMC affect both the tendency for one to make these errors and the efficacy 
with which feedback is used to improve source accuracy. 
Source Memory – Training Phase (Part 1) 
Even though our primary interest is in the source errors rates of the assessment phase (Part 2), we 
first report our findings for the training phase (Part 1). We analyzed source errors for suggested items 
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in a 2X2X2 mixed model ANOVA; suggested once and thrice items served as the within-subjects 
factor, individual differences in WMC and feedback condition were the between-subjects factors. Most 
importantly, there was no significant effect of feedback (M = .45, M = .37 for feedback and the control 
conditions respectively, F (1, 66) = 1.1, MSE = .12, p = .30, ηp² = .02, collapsed across WMC), WMC 
(M = .45, M = .37, for low WMC and high WMC participants in that order;  F (1,66) = 1.1, MSE = .12, 
p = .30, ηp² = .02, collapsed across feedback condition) or an interaction between the two, F (1, 66) = 
.4, MSE = .21, p = .53, ηp² = .01. Thus, neither high nor low WMC participants benefited from 
feedback given during the training phase. Next, we examined source accuracy for the video materials. 
A trend was found that showed individuals with high WMC were more accurate compared to their low 
WMC counterparts for the video material (M = .84, M = .70 , high WMC and low WMC respectively; 
F (1, 66) = 2.6, MSE = .05, p = .11, ηp² = .04, collapsed across feedback condition). For the feedback 
conditions we found a pattern similar to the critical item source errors; again participants who didn’t 
receive feedback were slightly more accurate (M = .80) in comparison to those who did receive 
feedback (M = .78), F (1, 66) = .240, MSE = .05, p = .6, ηp² = .004. 
Taken as a whole, the training phase showed small differences between the two conditions, with 
the control condition making slightly fewer source errors to critical items and video materials. 
Furthermore, high WMC participants were slightly more accurate for both the critical items and video 
items. Additionally, there was no interaction between WMC and feedback for the video materials (F 
(1, 66) = 0, MSE = .06, p = 1, ηp² = 0) 
Source Memory Assessment Phase (Part 2) 
The results of interest for this study concern the performance on the assessment phase, specifically 
performance on the critical items (for all unconditionalized data see Table 2). All further analyses will 
address this subsection of the study. To review our prior hypotheses, individuals with high WMC 
should be able to more effectively use feedback compared to low WMC participants. 
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Table 2 
Unconditionalized Responses on Assessment Phase of Source Test as a Function of Feedback Condition and WMC. 
           Condition 
Item Type  Response   No FB Low No FB High  FB Low FB High 
Video  Video Only   .82 (.05) .84 (.06)  .84 (.04) .88 (.07) 
   Questions Only  .00 (.00) .00 (.00)   .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
   Both    .09 (.03) .06 (.03)   .03 (.02) .07 (.04) 
   Neither   .09 (.03) .10 (.04)   .13 (.04) .05 (.04) 
 
Suggested X 1 Video Only   .05 (.04) .06 (.04)   .08 (.04) .00 (.00) 
   Questions Only  .34 (.09) .50 (.10)   .42 (.09) .53 (.09) 
   Both    .34 (.10) .15 (.06)   .11 (.05) .10 (.05) 
   Neither   .26 (.07) .29 (.07)   .39 (.09) .37 (.09) 
  
Suggested X 3 Video Only   .05 (.04) .06 (.04)   .03 (.03) .07 (.05) 
   Questions Only  .34 (.09) .41 (.09)   .47 (.09) .63 (.09) 
   Both    .55 (.11) .35 (.09)   .32 (.08) .20 (.08) 
   Neither   .05 (.04) .18 (.06)   .18 (.07) .10 (.05) 
 
Control  Video Only   .08 (.06) .12 (.05)   .11 (.05) .13 (.06) 
   Questions Only  .00 (.00) .00 (.00)   .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
   Both    .00 (.00) .00 (.00)   .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
   Neither   .92 (.06) .88 (.05)   .89 (.05) .87 (.06) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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This would be reflected in an interaction between working memory and the feedback condition. This 
would be seen as a greater reduction in errors for the high span participants who received feedback, 
compared to the amount of decrease in errors for low WMC participants when feedback is given. In 
brief, the difference between the source errors for the feedback and the control conditions should be 
larger for participants with high WMC than low WMC. On the other hand, participants with high 
WMC may already have metamnemonic knowledge that accurately reflects the task’s constraints. If 
this were the case, we would not expect the addition of feedback to show a large reduction in errors. 
Conversely, participants with low WMC, who may have inaccurate metamnemonic knowledge, may 
show a larger reduction in errors with the inclusion of feedback. If this is the case, the error reduction 
difference between the control and feedback conditions for participants with low WMC will be larger 
in comparison to high WMC participants. Finally, a third possibility might show that both high and 
low WMC participants benefit similarly because strategic processing is not needed in order to benefit 
from feedback.  
To investigate these hypotheses, we conducted analyses similar to those of the training phase. First, 
we analyzed error rates in a 2X2X2 mixed model ANOVA. Again, the within subjects factor was the 
number of presentations (suggested once and suggested thrice) and the between-subjects factors were 
WMC and feedback. Consistent with prior work, we found a main effect of feedback, F (1, 66) = 6.5, 
MSE = .09, p = .01, ηp² = .09, collapsed across WMC, where participants who received feedback in the 
training session made significantly fewer source errors to critical items (M = .22) compared with the 
control condition (M = .40). Moreover, we found a near significant main effect of WMC, F (1, 66) = 
3.6, MSE = .09, p = .06, ηp² = .05, collapsed across feedback condition: with low WMC participants 
committing more source errors (M = .38) than high WMC participants (M = .25).  
At this point, we have demonstrated that both of our manipulations have had their prescribed 
effects; feedback resulted in a decrement of source errors and high WMC participants made fewer 
critical item source errors compared to low WMC. What is crucial for our prior hypotheses is whether 
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an interaction exists and, if so, what direction did it take. With that said, we found no interaction 
between feedback condition and WMC, F (1, 66) = .6, MSE = .11, p = .44, ηp² = .01. To insure that this 
finding was not due to low statistical power, a power analysis was conducted. With the partial eta 
squared equaling .01, one degree of freedom and two groups, an estimated sample size of 1,433 
participants would be needed to achieve significance. This finding is in line with our third hypothesis, 
which suggested that high and low WMC participants would benefit similarly from the inclusion of 
feedback. This speculation was hypothesized due to prior work, which advocated that the use of 
feedback might be largely implicit (Han & Dobbins, 2008).  
Conditionalized Source Responses 
To see conditionalized source response means for critical items and video only items see Table 3. 
To obtain a purer measure of the impact WMC and feedback have on source monitoring, 
conditionalized accuracy rates were calculated. Unlike unconditionalzed accuracy rates, which include 
aspects of both source monitoring and old/new recognition, these computations focus exclusively on 
items recognized as previously studied. In other words, these computations are the proportion of 
correct source attributions when the item was recognized as old. Similar to our previous analyses, we 
conducted a 2X2X2 ANOVA, this time with conditionalized accuracy rates for suggested once and 
thrice items as the within-subjects factor and, again, feedback and WMC as the between-subjects 
factors. As before, we found a significant main effect of feedback, F (1, 57) = 5.67, MSE = .13, p = 
.021, ηp² = .09, with the feedback condition (M = .75) significantly more accurate then the control 
condition (M= .53) for critical items. 
 Unlike the previous analysis, there is only a trend towards high WMC participants being more 
accurate than low WMC participants (M =.59, M=.69, for low WMC and high WMC participants 
respectively; F (1, 57) = 1.16, MSE = .13, p = .29, ηp² = .02).  
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Table 3  
Conditionalized Responses on Assessment Phase of Source Test. 
          Condition 
Item Type Response    No FB Low No FB High  FB Low FB High 
Suggested X 1 Accurate Attribution  .53 (.12) .66 (.11)  .77 (.11) .85 (.09)  
   Misattribution Error  .47 (.12) .34 (.11)  .23 (.11) .15 (.09) 
 
Suggested X 3 Accurate Attribution  .39 (.11) .53 (.11)  .56 (.10)  .70 (.09)  
   Misattribution Error  .61 (.11) .47 (.11)  .44 (.10)  .30 (.09) 
 
Video  Accurate Attribution  .89 (.04) .91 (.06)  .97 (.02) .90 (.07) 
   Misattribution Error  .11 (.04) .09 (.06)  .03 (.02) .10 (.07) 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Data presented in this table represents the proportion of items recognized and attributed to a 
source. For both the suggested X 1 and suggested X3 items the accurate attribution is questions only, the misattribution error is either a 
response of video only or a response of both video and questions. For the video items, the accurate attribution is video only the 
misattribution error is either the response of questions only or attributing it to both sources. Low and high labels indicate the WMC 
measured in a previous experiment.  
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Although, these results are not significant it is possible that they are due to the small sample size and 
the nature of the calculation (i.e. participants must attribute a source to one of the two critical items in 
order to be included in the analyses).   Specifically, a total of nine participants could not be included 
because they did not attribute at least one suggested item (once or thrice) to an experimental source 
(i.e., video, questions, or both). 
Misinformation Effect 
 In order to look more closely at the impact of the suggested information in the critical items, 
misinformation effects were calculated for all participants. These calculations take the source errors 
made on critical items (responses of video only or both) and then subtract the video and both responses 
on control items. This allows one to observe participants suggestibility correcting for biases they may 
have to one or both of these sources. The pattern of data found here is very similar to that found in our 
previous analyses of the assessment phase. Again, we found a main effect of feedback condition with 
those who received feedback having a significantly smaller misinformation effect (M = .10, M = .31, 
feedback and the control conditions respectively; F (1, 66) = 4.5, MSE = .16, p = .04, ηp² = .06, 
collapsed across WMC). Also, as previously shown, we find a marginally significant main effect of 
WMC, with low WMC participants having a larger misinformation effect size (M = .29) compared to 
high WMC participants (M = .12), F (1, 66) = 3.1, MSE = .16, p = .08, ηp² = .05, collapsed across 
feedback condition. And, as seen before, there was no significant interaction between WMC and 
feedback, F (1, 66) = .4, MSE = .16, p = .5, ηp² = .01.  
Post-experiment Questionnaire  
Participants in the feedback conditions were asked a number of questions about their use of feedback 
during the test. Answers to these questions were correlated with source monitoring performance on 
suggested items in the assessment phase of the test.   
Additionally, several items in the post-source test questionnaire discussed participant’s use of 
feedback. Because the pattern of correlations was similar for low and high WMC participants, I report 
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the correlations collapsed across WMC conditions. The responses to the following questions were not 
significantly correlated with source errors during the assessment phase of the test: How challenging 
was it to use the feedback (r (14) =.16, p = .60), how helpful was the feedback (r (14) =-.21, p = .47), 
and how often did you use the feedback (r (20) =-.17, p = .46). However, there was a significantly 
positive correlation between participants’ reported effort in using the feedback and source monitoring 
errors (r (14) = .75, p = .002).  In other words,  the more effort participants put into using feedback the 
more source errors they committed.  
Together these findings support the suggestion that participants are largely unaware of how they 
are using feedback or whether it is beneficial. It is also possible, as suggested by the significantly 
positive correlation between effort and source errors, that participants who attempt to learn from the 
feedback in more effortful, deliberate manner may end up committing more source errors.  
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DISCUSSION 
As expected from prior work (Lane, et al., 2007), feedback was effective in reducing source 
misattribution errors for suggested items. Also, as predicted, participants with high WMC produced 
fewer source errors than participants with low WMC (albeit marginally significant). Finally, there was 
no evidence that working memory capacity plays a major role in people’s ability to improve memory 
accuracy through the use of feedback.  
Our findings do not appear to support the view of feedback usage that is implied by the knowledge 
updating framework (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000). In this view, the process of monitoring, identifying, 
and updating knowledge appears to be quite demanding of executive resources. In source monitoring 
terms, this suggests the use of more deliberate systematic processes (Johnson, et al., 1993). Yet, both 
high and low WMC participants seemed to use feedback to the same benefit. It is important to keep in 
mind that these working memory span tasks, used for classification of the participants, were developed 
to measure the executive attentional control component of working memory (Unsworth, et al. 2005). 
Therefore, it can be inferred that individual differences in this component do not affect feedback usage.  
Our findings also contrast with an alternative prediction based on the premise that high WMC 
participants already have accurate knowledge of task constraints (metamnemonic knowledge) and thus 
should benefit less, if at all, from feedback relative to low WMC participants. Instead, our results 
suggest much room for improvement among high WMC participants. For example, high WMC 
participants attributed, on average, 31% of the suggested items to the video without feedback and 18% 
of the suggested items with feedback. Thus, even high WMC participants may not detect the degree to 
which features can be optimally used to discriminate between sources. 
The results are most consistent with the view that the processes used to learn from feedback at test 
are relatively implicit. In other words, participants clearly are aware of the feedback itself, but may be 
relatively unaware of how this feedback changes subsequent memory decisions. This view is consistent 
with recent research (Han et al., 2008) that suggests that feedback can have an effect without conscious 
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awareness. In this study, participants were given an old/ new recognition test, which was divided into 
three blocks. Feedback was administered by informing the participants of the accuracy of their 
previous response. Unbeknownst to the participants, the feedback they received was systematically 
accurate or inaccurate. For example, during one block participants were given feedback encouraging a 
more liberal response (e.g., items that were new but called old elicited a correct feedback response). 
Then, for the following block, the bias changed; now the feedback encouraged a more conservative 
response (e.g. items that were old but called new received a correct feedback response). In this way, 
they manipulated the response criterion of their participants without their explicit knowledge. 
Although our results do not suggest a criterion shift, participants do seem to be largely unaware of 
using feedback.  
This lack of awareness can also be seen from information obtained during the post-source test 
questionnaire used in the present study. Several questions addressed how feedback was used, how 
helpful it was, etc. With one exception, there was no significant correlation between the responses to 
these questions and overall source accuracy. In the one exception, we asked participants about the 
amount of effort they expended in trying to improve their performance using feedback (with zero 
signifying no effort, and nine indicating a lot of effort). We found a significantly positive correlation 
between source errors and effort, meaning that as reported effort increased so did the number of source 
errors to critical items. Although not definitive, it appears that participants may either be unaware of 
how they are using feedback or that trying to use feedback in a more deliberate manner could possibly 
be counter-productive.  
In conclusion, the current experiment provides clear evidence that while participants with high 
WMC outperform participants with low WMC on critical items, both groups significantly benefit from 
the inclusion of feedback. Most importantly for our predictions, both groups are able to benefit to the 
same degree with the inclusion of feedback. This supports the idea that differences in WMC have little 
to no affect on the ability to successfully use feedback so as to reduce source errors. Future studies will 
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need to more closely examine the potential implicit nature of feedback. An important next test to this 
theory will be to compare groups where the ability for participants to explicitly use feedback is 
disrupted and where participants are forced to explicitly use feedback. This may provide more 
evidence  supporting the current findings of this study.  
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